Much damage is done to the president by the advisers who constantly poison his soul and feed his propensity for confrontation and polarization. It is worse that he listens to them and even more that he is an easy prey for manipulation of those who have taken his action in the National Palace. The result is a failed decision-making process, which shows its malicious disposition and shows shortcomings in the executive management and causes stumbling in the exercise of government. In a few weeks, the cases of Julio Scherer from the Presidency’s legal advisers, Santiago Nieto from the Financial Intelligence Unit and Arturo Herrera, from the Presidency of the Bank of Mexico, will paint President Andrés Manuel López Obrador as a mercury politician who catches up quickly and makes decisions without thinking about the consequences. .
Herrera is the last to go through the guillotine. He did it unscrupulously and hid from her that he had long ago decided that what he promised would not hold. The president knew he was going to kill him, but let him die inexplicably without knowing his fate. It is a political brutality that López Obrador did, in retaliation for ignoring him, as finance minister, to dehydrate the opposition governments before the midterm elections, which violated the tax coordination law, which distributes shares to states and municipalities.
Appointing Herrera as head of the Bank of Mexico would have been an initial mistake, very typical of the president, who, in order to get rid of officials, uses the gaps that are opened in his team to fill them with unwanted things. The clearest previous case was with Esteban Moctezuma, whom he no longer wanted as Minister of Education, but did not know what to do with him until Martha Bárcena prematurely resigned from the Mexican Embassy in Washington and López Obrador found his fate in that office. The president never looked positively on Herrera and wanted to get rid of him. The term of office of Governor Alejandro Díaz de León, who never considered ratifying it, opened the door to Herrera.
Things would have gone smoothly, but shortly after taking over from his replacement, Rogelio Ramírez de la O, who also did not see Herrera well, informed the president that the instructions to change federal participation had not been followed – even though Herrera had acted accordingly. with with law-. There his fate was sealed. In August, de Morena’s coordinator in the Senate, Ricardo Monreal, asked to remove Herrera’s ratification at the Banco de México from the agenda, which he did secretly. More than two months later, last week, President Herrera announced that he had changed. In his place, the president yesterday proposed to Victoria Rodríguez, the deputy secretary of finance, which is also an event.
When Ramírez de la O joined the secretary, he brought with him three new sub-secretaries he wanted to appoint, one of whom would replace Rodríguez. The president vetoed all three, as one of them, Alejandro Reynoso, had worked in Carlos Salina’s government, under the command of Pedro Aspe, the then finance minister. The remorse over Herrera paved the way for the deputy secretary, who was done a service in her career even though her appointment, to the service of the government, is harmful. The markets, which welcomed Herrera’s appointment, reacted badly to Rodríguez, whose merit, the president said, is being a woman.
Decisions made on the knees are a good part of the president’s problem. Herrera’s previous case is with Nieto, in the Financial Intelligence Unit, which he publicly burned, pointing out that marriage in Guatemala, which violated the principles of austerity, had been “scandalous”. The president did not intend to fire Nieto, but on Sunday and Monday, the propaganda chief and chief architect behind the polarization, Jesús Ramírez Cuevas, filled his head with what Nieto had done was an “excess”. Finally, he ordered his dismissal two days after the wedding and appointed Pablo Gómez, who once again took a rabbit out of his hat, an experienced parliamentarian with no administrative background or knowledge of the subject.
López Obrador, with the same modus operandi, gave Gómez the job he had ordered to find him in government since losing the federal deputation in the midterm elections. We must thank – read this with sarcasm – that did not find a place quickly, that the president before Nieto’s premature departure found the requested job in that place. But it had not been two weeks since the appointment of Gómez, when López Obrador began to say in the National Palace that he might have hastened by dismissing Nieto, and thought that the veteran politician lacked experience, not because of the poorly armed cases in FIU, it would make the ongoing investigations go wrong.
Without having the same feeling with Scherer, the case is similar. The legal adviser resigned because the president was to remove the political power that authorized him during the first part of the six-year term. López Obrador had been listening to the intrigues of various people, especially Ramírez Cuevas, against Scherer for several weeks. Even after his resignation, he continued to attack him and accuse him before the president of having acted on the Lozoya and Ancira cases, which further worsened the relationship between López Obrador and Scherer, whose separation continues to widen, with unimaginable potential consequences.
Scherer, Nieto and Herrera – this one not because of proximity, but because of responsibility – were part of the president’s circle of power, who with their outbursts of rage and tactfully charged them for their accounts and dared, true, false, correct or magnified, he came into greater depths of administration, articulation and order. López Obrador will not change. Experience affects him, but does not change his actions, which explains the increasingly negative stumbling blocks and returns during his presidency.